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Understanding Current Legal C	
0	e,

This book will teach you techniques that, if used in the wrong way, will get you in trouble with the law. Me saying this is like a driving instructor saying, "I'm going to teach you how to drive; if you drive badly, you might run someone over." In both cases, any harm done would be your fault.

#### Tools & Traps...

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### Want to Check that Firewall?

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There are an incredible number of freeware tools available to you for beginning your checks of vulnerability. I have a couple of favorites that allow for quick probes and checks of information about various IP addresses:

- SuperScan, from Foundstone Corporation: www.foundstone.com/ knowledge/free\_tools .html
- Sam Spade, from SamSpade.org: www.samspade.org.

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✓ There are seven classes of attacks: denial of service (DoS), information leakage, regular file access, misinformation, special file/database access, remote arbitrary code execution, and elevation of privileges.

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## John the Ripper

John the Ripper is another password-cracking program, but it differs from Crack in that it is available in UNIX, DOS, and Win32 editions. Cracc is great for older systems using crypt(), but John th Ripper is better for newer systems using MD5 and similar password formats

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### Understanding Why Unexpected Data Is Dangerous

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Almost all applications interact with the user, and thus take data from them.

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
An application can't assume that the user is playing by the rules.

☑ The application has to be wary of buffer overflows, logic alteration, and the validity of data passed to system functions.

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### Understanding Session Hijacking

- The point of hijacking a connection is to steal trust.
- ✓ Hijacking is a race scenario: Can the attacker get an appropriate response packet in before the legitimate server or client can?

Attackers can remotely modify routing tables to redirect packets or get a system into the routing path between two hosts.

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### Tools & Traps...

#### Perfect Forward Secrecy: SSL's Dirty Little Secret

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The dirty little secret of SSL is that, unlike SSH and unnecessarily like standard PGP, its standard modes are not perfectly forward secure. This means that an attacker can lie in wait, sniffing encrypted traffic at its leisure for as long as it desires, until one day it breaks in and steals the SSL private key used by the SSL engine (which is extractable from all but the most custom hardware).

### Primary questions for privacy of communications include the following:

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 Can anyone else monitor the traffic within this tunnel? Read access, addressed by encryption.

e,

Can anyone else modify the traffic within this tunnel, or surreptitiously gain access to it? Write access, addressed primarily through authentication.

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### Understanding Hardware Hacking

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Hardware hacking is done for the following reasons:

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- General analysis of the product to determine common security weaknesses and attacks
- Access to the internal circuit without evidence of device tampering
- Retrieval of any internal or secret data components
- Cloning of the device
- Retrieving memory contents
- Elevation of privilege

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A "worm" is a program that can run independently, will consume the resources of its host from within in order to maintain itself, and can propagate a complete working version of itself on to other machines.

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### Tools & Traps...

Baiting with Honeyne

Recently, there has bee an upsurge in the use honeynets as a defensive tool. A honeynet is a system that is deployed with the intended purp of being compromised. These are hyper defens tools that can be imple mented at any location inside a network. The c rent best known config ration type for these to is where two systems a deployed, one for the the other configured to log all traffic.

### **Vulnerability Scanners** by Number

Product	Vulnerability Count
ISS Internet Scanner	976
NAI CyberCop Scanner	830
BV Control for Internet Security	900
Harris STAT Scanner	1,200
Symantec NetRecon	600
eEye Retina	820

#### **Deciding How Much** Detail to Publish 6

e)

- ☑ Take great care in deciding whether or not you want to provide exploit code with your NSF report.
- ☑ You must be prepared to take a slight risk when reporting security flaws. You could end up facing the vendor's wrath.
- ☑ Be extra cautious in describing any security flaw that requires the circumvention of a vendor's copyright protection mechanisms.

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